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Introduction 
Hate crime is a priority area for the Government, policymakers and criminal justice agencies, 
including the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS).1 It is also a topic that has attracted significant 
academic attention and has been subject to a Law Commission project that was completed in 
2014,2 with the Commission recently announcing a further review of hate crime legislation.3 To 
date, much of the discussion on hate crime laws has been informed by, and focused on, the victim 
and prosecution perspective. This perspective can, for example, provide grounds for extending 
the racially and religiously aggravated offences in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA) to 
cover further characteristics, namely disability, sexual orientation and transgender identity.4 At 
present, hostility on the basis of these latter three characteristics can only be taken into account 
at sentencing for a criminal offence.5 Conversely, relatively little consideration has been given to 
                                                          
* The authors would like to thank Kay Goodall for her research assistance on this project.  We would also 
like to thank Chara Bakalis, Peter Ramsay, Jonathan Bushell (Senior Policy Analyst, Crown Prosecution 
Service [nothing should be taken to represent the views of the CPS]), the reviewer and the Editor for their 
helpful feedback on earlier versions of this article. This research was funded by the EU Directorate-General 
Justice and Consumers Department.  
1 See, for example, HM Government, Action Against Hate: The UK Government’s plan for tackling hate 
crime – ‘two years on’ (Home Office, 2018). See also the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) public policy 
statements on hate crime and hate crime prosecution policies, available at https://www.cps.gov.uk/hate-
crime [last accessed 14 January 2019]. 
2
 Law Commission, Hate Crime: Should the Current Offences be Extended? (2014), Law Com. No.348. 
3
 In October 2018, it was announced that the Law Commission will undertake a further review of hate crime 
to explore how to make current legislation more effective and consider if there should be additional 
protected characteristics. 
4 See, for example, Law Commission, Hate Crime (2014), ch 4; M.A. Walters, S. Wiedlitzka and A. Owusu-
Bempah, Hate Crime and the Legal Process: Options for Law Reform (University of Sussex 2017), Part C. 
5 Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA), s.146. 
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the defence perspective; to the question of whether current law and procedure sufficiently 
safeguard the rights and interests of defendants, as well as the question of whether, or how, policy 
development and legal reform would affect the position of the defence. It is important to consider 
the defence perspective because if hate crime laws and policies are to withstand critical scrutiny, 
they must not only work to ensure that victims are protected under the law, but that defendants’ 
procedural rights are respected, including the right to information and the presumption of 
innocence. This article presents findings from a two-year EU-funded empirical study of the 
operation of hate crime legislation which sheds light on the extent to which current law and 
procedure is fair to defendants and, in so doing, helps to answer the question of how defendants 
would be affected by law reform, particularly extension of the CDA to cover disability, sexual 
orientation and transgender identity.6 
The aim of our study was to assess the application of criminal laws (namely racially and religiously 
aggravated offences)7 and sentencing provisions for hate crime in England and Wales,8 and to 
detail the operational realities of hate crime legislation by gathering experiential accounts of the 
legislation “in action” from legal professionals. We undertook a thematic analysis of: public policies 
and publicly available statistics on hate crime; over 100 reported cases;9 and 71 in-depth, 
qualitative semi-structured interviews. We interviewed 21 Hate Crime Leads and Hate Crime 
Coordinators at the CPS;10 17 independent barristers;11 nine Crown Court judges;12 11 District 
Judges (Magistrates’ Courts);13 six police officers (and linked personnel); six practitioners working 
                                                          
6 The full report can be found at, Walters, Wiedlitzka and Owusu-Bempah, Hate Crime and the Legal 
Process: Options for Law Reform (2017). The study was funded by the EU Directorate-General Justice and 
Consumers department and forms part of a wider European comparative study into the use of hate crime 
laws across five EU member states (England and Wales; Ireland; Sweden; Latvia; and the Czech Republic). 
See, J. Schweppe, A. Haynes, and M.A. Walters, The Lifecycle of a Hate Crime: Comparative Report 
(Dublin: ICCL, 2018). 
7 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA), ss.28-32. Note that our study did not cover hate speech offences 
(e.g. stirring up of hatred, as per Part 3 and 3A of the Public Order Act 1986). We distinguish between hate 
crimes and hate speech offences, as the latter concerns additional issues pertaining to free speech and the 
use of online platforms. These issues require a separate detailed analysis which fell beyond the scope of 
the original project.  
8 CJA 2003, ss.145 and 146. 
9 We are grateful to Chara Bakalis for giving us access to a list of cases on hate crime previously collated 
up to March 2014. 
10 Interviewees are cited as CPS #. 
11 Cited as IB #. 
12 Cited as CCJ #. 
13 Cited as DJ #. 
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for a charitable organisation or civil society organisation that supports victims of hate crime; and 
one hate crime victim who had been through the court process.14   
This article is one of a series of articles that presents our key findings in respect of the legal 
process for hate crime, from policing through to trial and sentencing.15 In the first part of the article, 
we analyse procedural issues that can arise during prosecution of racially and religiously 
aggravated offences under the CDA from the point of view of the defendant, while also highlighting 
relevant issues that can affect the interests of victims and their wider communities. We focus on 
whether, and how, current charging practices can cause injustice to both defendants and victims. 
Procedural issues stemming from charging practices have been a cause of confusion and concern 
since the racially aggravated offences were first introduced.16 By providing new empirical insights 
into these issues, we show that, notwithstanding developments in policy and practice over the 
years, there is a risk of “over-” and “under-conviction”, “double conviction”, and “over-charging”. 
Each of these will be explained below, along with tangible recommendations to tighten up 
procedure in order to ensure fair outcomes where defendants are charged with racially and 
religiously aggravated offences. 
Despite current procedures sometimes creating a risk of inaccurate or unfair outcomes, 
interviewees suggested that it is better for defendants to be charged and prosecuted for an 
aggravated offence under the CDA than it is to have a judge determine whether an offence was 
a hate crime for the purpose of sentencing. We explore the basis for this proposition in the second 
part of the article. We note several principled reasons why it could be in the best interests of 
defendants to extend aggravated criminal offences to cover the characteristics that are currently 
only set out in sentencing provisions for hate crime. These reasons enhance the fairness and 
strengthen the legitimacy of hate crime legislation. Thus, if defendants’ rights and interests can 
be adequately protected during prosecution for aggravated offences, and to a greater degree than 
through the application of sentencing provisions for hate crime, there may be additional reason to 
not only extend the offences to cover disability, sexual orientation and transgender identity, but 
also to replace the relevant sentencing provisions with legislation that allows for any offence to 
                                                          
14 For full details of our methodology, see Walters, Wiedlitzka and Owusu-Bempah, Hate Crime and the 
Legal Process (2017), paras 2-2.5. 
15 In a previous article, we emphasised the need for better and more effective enforcement of hate crime 
laws to address the “justice gap” that exists in hate crime cases, and set out our main proposals for law 
reform, including the introduction of a new Hate Crime Act. See M.A. Walters, A. Owusu-Bempah and S. 
Wiedlitzka, ‘Hate Crime and the “Justice Gap”: The Case for Law Reform’ [2018] 12 Crim. L.R. 958. 
16 See, for example, E. Burney and G. Rose, Racist Offences: How is the Law Working? (Home Office 
Research Study 244, 2002); A. Owusu-Bempah, “Prosecuting Hate Crime: Procedural Issues and the 
Future of the Aggravated Offences” (2015) 35(3) L.S. 443. 
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be prosecuted as an aggravated offence. However, as we explore within the second part of the 
article, the current legal framework in respect of aggravated offences can be manipulated to 
secure unmerited acquittals, leading one of our interviewees to declare that the requirement to 
prove “hostility” was “God’s gift to defence”. We explain the need for a refined “hostility test” to 
prevent such manipulation before concluding that properly operating substantive offences could 
ensure the effective application of hate crime legislation, while avoiding the imposition of improper 
and unjustified convictions and sentences. 
 
Hate crime laws 
Before turning to the substance of the article, it is necessary to outline briefly the anatomy of 
racially and religiously aggravated offences. Throughout the article, we refer to these as RRAOs 
to distinguish them from other offences where hostility based on a personal characteristic is 
treated as an aggravating factor at sentencing. There are 11 basic offences that can be 
prosecuted as racially or religiously aggravated, as set out in ss.29-32 of the CDA. They cover 
various forms of assault,17 public order offences,18 criminal damage,19 and harassment and 
stalking offences.20 The RRAOs carry higher maximum sentences than their basic offence 
counterparts. 
In accordance with s.28(1) of the CDA, the basic offence becomes aggravated if: 
(a) at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after doing so, the 
offender demonstrates towards the victim of the offence hostility based on the victim’s 
membership (or presumed membership) of a racial or religious group; or 
(b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards members of a racial or 
religious group based on their membership of that group. 
Alongside the RRAOs, there are sentencing provisions for hate crime which mirror the 
requirements of s.28 of the CDA. Sections 145 and 146 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA) 
require judges to treat hostility on the basis of race or religion (s.145), or disability, sexual 
orientation or transgender identity (s.146) as an aggravating factor at sentencing for any criminal 
                                                          
17 CDA 1998, s.29. 
18 CDA 1998, s.31. 
19 CDA 1998, s.30. 
20 CDA 1998, s.32. 
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offence.21 In these latter types of cases, where identity-based hostility is disputed, the issue should 
ordinarily be determined at a Newton hearing,22 or, “at the very least, plain and adequate notice 
must be given by the sentencer that he is considering sentencing on an enhanced or aggravated 
basis”.23 At a Newton hearing, the prosecution and defence can call evidence and the prosecution 
must satisfy the judge of the hostility element before a sentence is increased.24 The main focus 
of this article is the operation of the RRAOs. However, we will return to the sentencing provisions 
when considering whether the CDA better safeguards the rights and interests of defendants than 
the CJA, such that extension of the CDA could be in the best interests of defendants. 
 
Charging decisions  
When a defendant is accused of multiple crimes, they can be charged with multiple offences. 
Where the offences are tried together, in summary trials, each charge is laid separately and, in 
trials on indictment, each offence forms a separate count on the indictment, with separate verdicts 
returned on each count.25 However, there are many instances throughout the criminal law where 
one offence includes another separate offence26 and, while the guilty offender has satisfied the 
requirements of two (or more) offences, as explained below, it would be unjust to convict them of 
both offences. This is true of the RRAOs.27 For example, if an offender racially abuses a victim 
while wounding them, the defendant’s conduct can amount to both racially aggravated malicious 
wounding and basic malicious wounding. The CPS has the option of pursuing the aggravated 
offence alone or charging the aggravated and basic offence in the alternative. Where the offences 
are presented in the alternative, the defendant can be convicted of one or the other offence (or 
neither), but not both. If the aggravated offence is proven beyond reasonable doubt, the defendant 
should be convicted of the aggravated offence. If there is insufficient evidence of racial or religious 
                                                          
21 Note that s.145 ‘applies where a court is considering the seriousness of an offence other than one under 
sections 29 to 32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998’ (emphasis added). There is ongoing confusion as to 
whether s.145 can be applied to an offence which could have been, but was not, charged as an aggravated 
offence. See O’Leary [2015] EWCA Crim 1306.  
22 Newton (1983) 77 Cr. App. R. 13.  
23 O’Callaghan [2005] EWCA Crim 317 at [18]. 
24 Underwood [2004] EWCA Crim 2256 at [9]. 
25 Or, if the allegations relate to a course of conduct, they can be dealt with as multiple incident counts or 
specimen counts. 
26 For example, if an offender is guilty of wounding with intent contrary to s.18 of the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861, they must also have committed the lesser offence of wounding contrary to s.20. 
27 In line with the scope of our research project, the discussion in this section focusses on charging practices 
and their implications in hate crime cases. Interviewees were not asked about charging practices for other 
kinds of crime. However, the issues (and solutions) that we identified will likely be of relevance in respect 
of other kinds of offending where the offence charged includes a separate and less serious offence. 
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hostility, but the basic offence is proven, the defendant should be convicted of the basic offence. 
If there is insufficient evidence to prove the basic offence, the defendant should be acquitted. 
 
Charging decisions can have significant implications for the outcome of hate crime cases. For 
example, our research indicated that if the CPS charge the defendant with the aggravated version 
of an offence only, there is the potential during the legal process for the defendant to be either 
“over-convicted” or “under-convicted”. Over-conviction can occur where, despite the aggravated 
element of the offence not being proven beyond reasonable doubt, the defendant is convicted so 
that they do not escape liability for the basic offence. Conversely, under-conviction may occur 
where the aggravated element of the offence has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt and, 
as a result, the defendant is acquitted, despite there being sufficient evidence to prove the basic 
offence. One way to limit the potential for either of these outcomes is to present both offences in 
the alternative.  In fact, in summary trials, to avoid losing liability for the basic offence in case the 
aggravated element cannot be proven, it is necessary to lay charges for both the basic and 
aggravated offence in the alternative. This is because magistrates do not have the power to return 
alternative verdicts in hate crime cases, meaning that they cannot convict the defendant of a 
lesser crime than the one on the charge sheet. In trials on indictment, on the other hand, due to 
a complex body of legislation,28 if the prosecution does not include counts covering both the 
aggravated and basic offence on the indictment, the judge may (and should)29 allow the jury to 
return an alternative verdict regarding the basic offence. This means that, at the end of the trial, 
the jury can be directed that they may find the defendant guilty of the basic offence if the 
aggravated element is not proven.  
 
In a Home Office study published in 2002, Burney and Rose found a great variety of opinion and 
practice as to when, whether and why it is desirable to charge defendants with both the 
aggravated and basic versions of an offence,30 indicating confusion and inconsistency in the 
prosecution of hate crimes. Our study indicated that, in general, there is less concern about 
procedural problems related to charging decisions than in the early days of the RRAOs. For 
example, one Crown Court judge told us that, “[t]here’s no procedural issues at all” (CCJ 05). 
                                                          
28 See Criminal Law Act 1967, ss.6(3) and 6(3A); Criminal Justice Act 1988, s.40; Crime and Disorder Act 
1998, ss.31(6), 32(5) and 32(6). 
29 See Coutts [2006] UKHL 39 at [23]. See also Foster [2007] EWCA Crim 2869; Barre [2016] EWCA Crim 
216; Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2019), paras 4-532-
4-533; D. Ormerod and D. Perry (eds), Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2019), D19.41-D19.66. 
30 Burney and Rose, Racist Offences: How is the Law Working? (2002), 17. 
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Nonetheless, responses to specific questions about charging practices revealed inconsistency, 
uncertainty and dissatisfaction as to certain procedures and policies for charging and prosecuting 
aggravated offences, such that there is a risk of injustice to both defendants and victims of hate 
crime.31 Below, we explore current practice in respect of alternative charges and verdicts in hate 
crime cases, and how it might be improved, before addressing relatively new concerns about 
“over-charging”. 
 
Towards a fairer and more consistent practice 
The majority of lawyers and Crown Court judges that we interviewed indicated that, in trials on 
indictment, it is “good practice” (CPS 09) to put the basic offence to the jury as an alternative. 
They expressed a strong preference for separate counts on the indictment, rather than leaving an 
alternative verdict to the jury at the end of the trial. Separate counts were thought to be more 
transparent, making it easier for the jury to understand the issues in the case. Yet, several 
interviewees had experience of cases where the basic offence was not on the indictment or left 
to the jury, and a minority did not see the value in leaving an alternative in any form. For two CPS 
lawyers, the desirability of an alternative depends on the nature of the offence. If, for example, 
the defendant is accused of a racially aggravated public order offence, where the demonstration 
of racial hostility constitutes both the basic and aggravated offending behaviour, it can be seen 
as detrimental to put forward both offences “because it’s almost that you’re suggesting that you’ve 
got some doubts about your own case” (CPS 01). A further two CPS lawyers said that they would 
avoid presenting the alternative for all offences where the real gravamen of the complaint was the 
racial or religious hostility.32 Two others would prefer to “nail [their] colours to the mast” (CPS 03), 
regardless of the nature of the offence or the offending behaviour.  
The experiences of interviewees indicate that there remains inconsistency in the presentation of 
hate crime cases in the Crown Court, and where the basic offence is neither the subject of an 
alternative count on the indictment nor left to the jury as an alternative verdict, the possibility of 
both over- and under-conviction may well increase. A more consistent practice is, therefore, 
necessary in furtherance of the public interest in the administration of justice. To achieve this, in 
hate crime cases, the prosecution should ordinarily include the basic offence on the indictment 
                                                          
31 See further, Walters, Wiedlitzka and Owusu-Bempah, Hate Crime and the Legal Process (2017), paras 
7.1-7.5. 
32
 This perspective can also be observed in Mihocic [2012] EWCA Crim 195. 
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from the start of the trial, with one exception.33 The exception is cases where, without the hostility 
element, there is no basic offence. As mentioned above, the racially or religiously aggravated 
element of a public order offence can also amount to the basic offence. For instance, racially 
abusive words used towards a person with the intention of causing fear of violence34 will constitute 
both the basic offence and the aggravation, rendering the alternative count redundant. Including 
the basic offence on the indictment is consistent with CPS guidance on drafting indictments,35 but 
should be stated more plainly in prosecution guidance on racially and religiously aggravated 
crimes. The latter guidance currently states that, where there is no statutory provision for an 
alternative verdict in respect of the offence charged, “consideration has to be given to including 
alternative counts on the indictment”.36 There are statutory provisions for alternative verdicts for 
RRAOs.37 Thus, the guidance may be taken as suggesting that it is not necessary to consider 
alternative counts on indictments in respect of RRAOs. 
There have been some concerns that jurors might be confused by the inclusion of alternative 
counts, which may have the effect of “overloading” the indictment,38 and that this could also result 
in unfair and inaccurate outcomes. However, despite the provisions of the CDA being described 
as “really quite difficult” for juries (CCJ 06), most interviewees were of the view that alternatives 
do not present any significant problems and juries can cope with multiple charges in hate crime 
cases, just as they do in other kinds of cases. Nonetheless, it was suggested that juries could 
benefit from written directions and route to verdict documents, as well as early directions on the 
requirements of the offences, as a means of clarifying the issues in the case and aiding jurors’ 
understanding of the offences. It is hoped that this has (or will) become standard practice in hate 
                                                          
33 As recommended in Walters, Wiedlitzka and Owusu-Bempah, Hate Crime and the Legal Process (2017), 
para 7.1. 
34 Public Order Act 1986, s.4; CDA 1998, s.31. 
35 CPS, Drafting the Indictment, http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/d_to_g/drafting_the_indictment/ [accessed 14 
January 2019]. 
36 CPS, Racist and Religious Hate Crime – Prosecution Guidance, 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/racist_and_religious_crime/ [accessed 14 January 2019].  
37 See footnote 28. 
38 See Owusu-Bempah, ‘Prosecuting Hate Crime: Procedural Issues and the Future of the Aggravated 
Offences’ (2015), 457. See also, O’Leary [2015] EWCA Crim 1306 at [18]. 
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crime cases,39 with early and written directions to juries now being endorsed by the Criminal 
Practice Directions40 and the Crown Court Compendium.41 
As explained above, in the Magistrates’ Court, there is no power to return alternative verdicts in 
hate crime cases. Consequently, the CPS recommends that, from the outset, both the basic 
offence and the RRAO should be charged in the alternative.42 For the most part, alternative 
charges have become part of “standard CPS policy” in summary cases (CPS 21). The consistency 
in approach is to be commended. However, our findings confirm that the practice of alternative 
charges in summary trials can create practical difficulties (including where prosecutors try to lay 
an alternative charge after a trial has commenced), and can lead to undesirable outcomes, as 
explained below.43 For these reasons, magistrates should be accorded the power to return 
alternative verdicts on RRAOs. If this reform proposal were adopted, in each case, only the RRAO 
would need to be charged and, if the aggravated element were not proven, the defendant could 
be acquitted of the aggravated offence and convicted of the basic offence. Thus, while there are 
practical reasons why alternative counts on the indictment are preferred to alternative verdicts in 
Crown Court trials, there are practical reasons why alternative verdicts are preferred to alternative 
charges in summary trials. 
In 2002, Burney and Rose found such strong support for a power to return alternative verdicts in 
the Magistrates’ Court that they recommended a change in the law.44 Support for this proposition 
remains very strong among lawyers and judges. Only one District Judge who took a view on the 
issue was hesitant because the present situation does not present any “great problem” (DJ 10), 
while one CPS interviewee did not like the idea of the CPS relinquishing control over the 
presentation of the case. Three independent barristers also opposed the proposition because 
they did not want magistrates to have the opportunity to convict of the basic offence when they 
otherwise would have acquitted altogether. However, these barristers seemed to assume that the 
                                                          
39 Research indicates that 90% of judges ‘now use written directions some of the time, although there are 
differing views about how often, when and what form written directions should take.’ See, The Crown Court 
Compendium Part I: Jury and Trial Management and Summing Up (Judicial College, 2018), 1-7. 
40 CrimPD VI 26K. 
41 The Crown Court Compendium Part I: Jury and Trial Management and Summing Up (Judicial College, 
2018), 1-6 and 1-7. On the benefits of written directions, see also, C. Thomas, Are Juries Fair? MoJ 
Research Series 01/10 (Ministry of Justice, 2010), 35-40; C. Thomas, ‘Avoiding the Perfect Storm of Juror 
Contempt’ [2013] Crim. L.R. 483, 497-499. For a recent judicial observation on the benefits of written 
directions and route to verdict documents, see Atta-Dankwa [2018] EWCA Cri 320 at [27]-[33]. 
42 CPS, Racist and Religious Hate Crime – Prosecution Guidance. 
43 While our findings are confined to the operation of hate crime legislation, these issues may also arise in 
respect of other offences which can be charged in the alternative. 
44 Burney and Rose, Racist Offences: How is the Law Working? (2002), pp.80 and 113. 
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power to return an alternative verdict would be used where the prosecution failed to, or 
deliberately chose not to, charge a basic offence. In practice, because the prosecution ordinarily 
charge both offences, giving magistrates the power to return alternative verdicts (instead of 
considering alternative charges) would represent a change in approach, rather than according 
them more opportunities to convict.  
Charge bargaining 
One major concern of charges laid in the alternative is that it may increase the potential for “charge 
bargaining”; whereby the defendant offers or accepts a plea to the basic offence on the condition 
that the aggravated charge is dropped. This concern has been most prevalent in respect of the 
Magistrates’ Court, where both offences must be charged in order to avoid losing liability for the 
basic offence.45 Charge bargaining can give victims and the wider community the impression that 
hate crime is not taken seriously. At the same time, it can be detrimental to defendants who wish 
to maintain their innocence but feel pressured to plead guilty to the basic offence in order to avoid 
the risk of a harsher sentence and the stigma of being convicted of an aggravated offence.46 
When the racially aggravated offences first came into force, there was evidence to suggest that 
charge bargaining was prevalent.47 In response to criticisms, in 2003, it became CPS policy not 
to accept a plea to the basic offence alone to expedite the process.48 Our findings indicate that 
this policy has largely been successful, and that while charge bargaining remains a possibility, 
there has been a shift in attitude since the RRAOs first came into force.  
Indeed, the CPS lawyers that we interviewed were adamant that charge bargaining does not 
happen. Likewise, the majority of judges and independent barristers expressed the view that 
charge bargaining is very rare. In the experience of one barrister, “The CPS … will never accept 
a plea where there is a racially aggravated offence” (IB 08). One CPS interviewee explained that 
this change was a result of there being less “cultural resistance” to the legislation: 
“[L]ooking back historically, there was quite a bit of judicial resistance to the introduction of 
the new legislation. It was not uncommon for judges to put pressure on prosecutors to accept 
                                                          
45 Burney and Rose, Racist Offences: How is the Law Working? (2002), 96. 
46 Owusu-Bempah, ‘Prosecuting Hate Crime: Procedural Issues and the Future of the Aggravated Offences’ 
(2015), 451-453. 
47 Burney and Rose, Racist Offences: How is the Law Working? (2002), 80-83; G. John, Race for Justice: 
A Review of CPS Decision Making for Possible Racial Bias at Each Stage of the Prosecution Process (Gus 
John Partnership 2003), para 95.  
48 CPS, Racist and Religious Hate Crime – Prosecution Guidance. However, there may be circumstances 
where accepting a plea to the basic offence alone is justified. For example, where the complainant refuses 




a guilty plea to the basic offence; but I think culturally now, the judges in the Crown Court and 
in the Magistrates’ Court and magistrates are fully attuned to the legislation and the cultural 
change that they have to make when sentencing.” (CPS 17) 
Nonetheless, a small minority of interviewees had experience of charge bargaining, including four 
independent barristers, one of whom explained that charge bargaining “does happen 
occasionally” (IB 05). Moreover, although the problem has become less pressing, resource 
constraints and the “enormous” pressure to keep cases out of the Crown Court (CPS 20) may yet 
result in a reversal of current practice. One way to limit this potential could be for the Magistrates’ 
Court to be given the power to return alternative verdicts. This would make alternative charges 
unnecessary and, while there are many factors which operate to incentivise guilty pleas,49 
previous research indicated that the alternative charge can make the CPS appear more 
vulnerable to pressure to accept a charge bargain.50  On the other hand, since lawyers and judges 
are well aware of the underlying basic offence, its absence from the charge sheet may not have 
much impact on defence (or prosecution) tactics in summary cases. There is, nonetheless, a more 
pressing reason why alternative verdicts should be available in the Magistrates’ Court. 
Double convictions  
During our study we found that, where alternative charges are brought to trial in the Magistrates’ 
Court, some defendants are convicted of both the aggravated and basic offence. The reason for 
convicting of both offences is so that the conviction for the basic offence will stand if there is a 
successful appeal against the aggravated element.51 However, the consequence is that the 
defendant ends up with two criminal convictions on their record for the same crime, even if they 
only receive one sentence.52 The problem of “double convictions” has previously been addressed 
by the Divisional Court where it was held that is was unfair and disproportionate for a defendant 
to be convicted twice for a single wrong.53 In Henderson v CPS,54 the Divisional Court again held 
that there should not be findings of guilt on both charges. The Court confirmed that if there is 
evidence of the aggravated offence, the correct approach is to convict of the aggravated offence 
and adjourn the basic offence before conviction under s.10 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, 
                                                          
49 See generally J. Peay and E. Player, ‘Pleading Guilty: Why vulnerability matters’ (2018) 81(6) M.L.R. 
929. 
50 Burney and Rose, Racist Offences: How is the Law Working? (2002), 96. 
51 Under s.108 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, a person convicted by a Magistrates’ Court following a 
not-guilty plea may appeal to the Crown Court against their conviction. 
52 See R. Wheeler, ‘The Danger of the Double Conviction’ (2013) 177(12) Criminal Law and Justice 191.  
53 R (on the application of Dyer) v Watford Magistrates’ Court [2013] EWHC 547 (Admin). 
54 [2016] EWHC 464 (Admin). 
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so that if an appeal against the aggravated offence was successful, the lesser charge could 
subsequently be dealt with. 
Despite these recent judgments, we found evidence that double convictions are still being applied. 
Two of the 11 District Judges interviewed told us that they would convict of both charges, with 
one referring to “an obligation … to convict [of the basic offence] as well ...” (DJ 09), and the other 
taking the view that the two convictions on the defendant’s criminal record would not cause “a 
particular problem” (DJ 08). Several other interviewees, while familiar with the correct procedure 
for dealing with alternative charges, found it to be “clumsy” (CPS 13), overly-complex and 
administratively inconvenient. It was put to us that adjourning the basic offence, “causes problems 
for the courts’ recording system and [the CPS’] recording system” (CPS 01). One District Judge 
expressed the need for “a neater way of dealing with the alternative charges”. They told us that: 
“[I]f you find them guilty of the racially aggravated offence but then don’t return a decision 
on the lower charge because you want to preserve the position pending appeal, that lower 
charge then just hangs around … So that’s a tedious little bit of red tape, but it does cause 
some heartache for the … not for us as tribunals ... but for the administration underneath.” 
(DJ 03) 
It may be possible to reduce the risk of double convictions through training and further (accessible) 
clarification on the procedure for dealing with alternative charges in the Magistrates’ Courts.55 
However, given that we found dissatisfaction with adjourning the basic offence and letting it “hang 
around”, a more suitable solution would be to implement the recommendation that magistrates be 
accorded the power to return alternative verdicts on RRAOs. This minor reform could significantly 
reduce the risk of injustice to defendants in hate crime cases. 
Over-charging 
During interviews, we were keen to record the experiences and views of practitioners in respect 
of alternative charges and verdicts, so that we could assess the reality of concerns that have been 
raised elsewhere and develop recommendations to improve procedure. However, during our 
discussions with interviewees, a further concern about charging practices came to light, namely 
the perception that there is a tendency to “over-charge” defendants in hate crime cases. This 
issue was raised by a third of judges and independent barristers, with some expressing very 
                                                          
55 The latest version of the CPS guidance on prosecuting racist and religious hate crime refers to the 




strong concern that the CPS too readily pursues racially and religiously aggravated offences.  
These interviewees felt that the CPS had adopted an overly zealous “pro-charge” policy, which 
was attributed to “political pressure” on the CPS (CCJ 09) as well as fear of criticism from 
Government, the public and complainants who can request that a decision not to prosecute be 
reviewed. 
For many, criticism of CPS charging decisions reflected a view that hate crime legislation is too 
broad, and that a basic offence involving a “demonstration of hostility”, as opposed to an offence 
motivated by racial or religious hostility, is not worthy of prosecution as a “hate crime”. One Crown 
Court judge provided the following opinion: 
“If a defendant is prepared to admit an assault why are we going any further about it. There 
was some abuse between the two of them and he shouted some very rude things. Do we 
need to go through a trial process, which most likely going to result in an acquittal, to 
decide whether at the time he called someone a black so-and-so… the lesser form of the 
‘demonstrating’ rather than ‘motivated by’ aspect of it…” (CCJ 09) 
This line of thinking may illustrate a lack of appreciation of the impact that demonstrations of 
racism can have on both victims and society, even when they occur in the “heat of the moment”. 
We offer a defence of the “demonstration of hostility” limb of the CDA below. 
Others suggested that cases are proceeding to court where they do not satisfy the evidential 
stage of the test for prosecution, as set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors.56 One barrister, 
who had been acting for the prosecution, gave an example of a racially aggravated assault 
proceeding to trial despite the independent witnesses being “quite clear that they’d heard nothing 
racial” (IB 14). They told us that:   
“I’m not sure that [the CPS] always properly consider whether that extra element is made 
out and meets the prosecution test in the same way that the basic, the assault or whatever, 
they would do. I think that if they’ve got an assault that they think is an assault, and the 
victim says … ‘And they said this…’, they just charge it without thinking; and that does 
cause problems down the line.” (IB 14)  
                                                          
56 The Code requires “sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction”. See CPS, The Code 
for Crown Prosecutors (2018), para 4.6. 
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Putting it into stronger terms, another barrister stated that, “if the CPS see a word that can be 
racially construed, they will just slam on a charge … Even if there’s no prospect of succeeding” 
(IB 01). 
CPS guidance on racist and religious hate crime makes it clear that prosecution will usually be in 
the public interest.57 However, in accordance with the Code for Crown Prosecutors, cases must 
pass the “evidential” stage of the test for prosecution as well as the “public interest” stage, “no 
matter how serious or sensitive it may be”.58 It was not possible to substantiate claims that cases 
are proceeding to trial despite not meeting the requirements of the Code.59 However, the fact that 
a third of judges and independent barristers were critical of charging decisions is notable in itself, 
and, if nothing else, is revealing of attitudes towards hate crime legislation.  Still, it is worth stating 
that, while there are good reasons for rigorously pursuing allegations of hate crime, the rigid 
pursuance of cases that do not meet the requirements of the Code is problematic, both for 
complainant expectations about the case, and for the fair labelling of defendants. Moreover, some 
barristers noted that, where the evidence of hostility is weak, focusing on the aggravated element 
can lead juries to acquit altogether, even if there is evidence to support a serious underlying basic 
offence.  
Combined, then, the pursuance of cases that lack cogent forms of evidence may risk both over-
conviction and under-conviction. Such outcomes risk undermining the credibility of hate crime 
legislation and, more generally, confidence in the justice system amongst those who have 
experienced hate crime.  
 
The best interests of the defendant: CDA v CJA 
The analysis of charging practices for hate crime demonstrates the complexity, inconsistency and 
unsatisfactory outcomes that can result for defendants, victims and their wider communities. The 
intricacy of current law and procedure was one reason why a minority of interviewees did not want 
to see extension of the CDA, and why a small minority preferred the use of sentencing legislation 
rather than aggravated criminal offences.60 In a previous publication, following a doctrinal 
                                                          
57 See CPS, Racist and Religious Hate Crime – Prosecution Guidance. 
58 CPS, The Code for Crown Prosecutors (2018), para 4.6. 
59 However, it is notable that the issue of “over-charging” has been raised in respect of other sensitive 
priority areas, such as serious sexual offences. See HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, Thematic 
Review of the CPS Rape and Serious Sexual Offences Units (2016), paras 4.19-4.21. 
60 See Walters, Wiedlitzka and Owusu-Bempah, Hate Crime and the Legal Process (2017), para 11.2. 
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examination of procedural problems that can arise during the prosecution of aggravated offences, 
Owusu-Bempah argued that it would be logical to repeal the relevant provisions of the CDA and 
rely on sentencing provisions as the legislative response to hate crime.61 In all cases involving 
alleged hostility on the basis of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity, 
only the basic offence would be charged, and, if convicted, the hostility element could be 
determined and taken into account at sentencing. The inconsistent, and sometimes incorrect, 
application of ss.145 and 146 of the CJA could be alleviated through implementation of the Law 
Commission’s recommendation that new guidance be issued by the Sentencing Council.62  
 
However, our subsequent empirical research shows that, despite some significant procedural 
difficulties, the CDA provisions have become the cornerstone of the legal framework for hate 
crime, such that the majority of interviewees who provided an opinion on law reform were in favour 
of extending them to cover further characteristics. The aggravated offences are generally well 
comprehended by judges, lawyers and police officers, whereas, notwithstanding improvements 
in recent years, there continues to be a lack of awareness of ss.145 and 146 of the CJA.63 Further 
guidance, while still necessary, is unlikely to ensure the effective operation or application of the 
sentencing provisions.64 This means that, at present, it would be most beneficial to concentrate 
on eliminating the risk of unfair and unsatisfactory outcomes during prosecution of RRAOs, 
including by: consistently putting alternative counts on indictments in the Crown Court and 
providing jurors with written directions;65 allowing magistrates to return alternative verdicts in hate 
crime cases; ensuring that the required threshold for prosecution is met on the aggravated 
element of an offence; and addressing resistance to the “demonstration of hostility” test.  
While it is possible to rectify the procedural problems which can cause unfairness or injustice 
during prosecution for RRAOs, we are left with the question of whether defendants would benefit 
from (or, at least, not be disadvantaged by) the extension of the relevant provisions of the CDA 
to cover disability, sexual orientation and transgender identity, the three characteristics which are 
                                                          
61 Owusu-Bempah, ‘Prosecuting Hate Crime: Procedural Issues and the Future of the Aggravated Offences’ 
(2015). 
62 Law Commission, Hate Crime (2014), para 3.49-3.51. 
63 See Walters, Wiedlitzka and Owusu-Bempah, Hate Crime and the Legal Process (2017), para 9.7. 
64 However, it is notable that the proportion of flagged hate crime cases with a declared sentence uplift has 
increased from 11.8% in 2014/15 to 33.8% in 2015/16 to 52.2% in 2016-17 (beyond the period of the study). 
See CPS, Hate Crime Annual Report 2014-15; CPS, Hate Crime Annual Report 2015-16; CPS, Hate Crime 
Annual Report 2016-17. 
65 As is provided for by CrimPD VI 26K and The Crown Court Compendium Part I: Jury and Trial 
Management and Summing Up (Judicial College, 2018), 1-7. 
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currently only set out in sentencing provisions for hate crime. To answer this question, we must 
determine whether the rights and interests of those accused of hate crime are better served 
through prosecution for an aggravated offence under the CDA than by application of the enhanced 
sentencing provisions in the CJA. An obvious starting point is to consider the consequences of a 
finding against the defendant. 
The consequences of a conviction for a RRAO are more severe than an enhanced sentence 
under ss.145 or 146 of the CJA. While ss.145 and 146 require the sentence to be increased to 
take account of identity-based hostility, unlike the CDA, they do not provide for higher maximum 
sentences than the basic offence. However, in practice, the sentences passed for RRAOs very 
rarely exceed the maximum available for the basic version of the offence.66 What seems to be of 
more concern to defendants is the fact that RRAOs show on a criminal record as “racially or 
religiously aggravated”. The perception of interviewees across all cohorts was that defendants 
are very reluctant to accept liability for RRAOs because they do not want to be labelled a “racist”. 
Conversely, a conviction to which ss.145 or 146 is applied is recorded as a basic offence. Given 
the consequences of a conviction for a RRAO, we were surprised to find that some interviewees 
strongly believed that the CDA better protects the rights of defendants than the CJA, and this can 
provide a reason to extend the offences to cover all five statutorily recognised hate crime 
characteristics. The reasons provided in support of this assertion are explored in the following 
paragraphs. 
Transparency  
The CDA can safeguard defendants’ right to a fair trial by ensuring transparency as to the issues 
in the case.67 As one interviewee from the CPS explained:  
“[T]he defendant’s position would be better protected if hostility were proved as part of 
the offence, as an ingredient of the – as it is with the Crime and Disorder Act. Because 
then it’s very clear what the prosecution are saying, what the court has to be sure of; and 
all of the protections and other things that operate to protect the defendant are in place – 
and obviously so.” (CPS 03) 
                                                          
66 See Home Office, Ministry of Justice and Office for National Statistics, An Overview of Hate Crime in 
England and Wales (2013), Table 3.13. 
67 See, for example, European Convention on Human Rights, Art 6(3)(a) which provides the accused with 
a right to information about the nature and cause of the accusation against them, and Art 6(3)(b) which 
provides the right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence.  
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Where a defendant is charged with a RRAO, it is clear from the outset that racial or religious 
aggravation will be an issue at the trial. Moreover, the prosecution is under a duty to disclose to 
the defence any prosecution material that could reasonably be considered capable of 
undermining the prosecution case or assisting the defence case.68 Provided that the police and 
prosecution comply with their disclosure obligations,69 the defence should be able to prepare to 
challenge the evidence of hostility. For the reasons explained below, the same may not be true if 
hostility is not an element of the substantive offence, but, instead, is an aggravating factor for a 
judge to determine at sentencing.  
CPS prosecutors pointed to issues with some police officers not being aware of hate crime 
sentencing provisions,70 meaning that the prejudice element of hate crimes can become an 
afterthought, and evidence may not be available until a later stage in the proceedings. Also, since 
there remains a lack of awareness of the CJA provisions among some lawyers and judges, 
particularly defence barristers and Crown Court judges, reference to ss.145 or 146 sometimes 
“takes them by surprise” (CPS 03). Reduced opportunity to prepare sufficiently and challenge the 
accusation at the sentencing stage could result in an erroneous finding against the defendant.   
Scrutinising the evidence  
As well as creating transparency, the CDA enables trial by jury. The basic offences capable of 
being aggravated consist of both summary-only offences and either-way offences, whereas all 
but one of the RRAOs are triable-either-way.71 Although the bulk of RRAOs are dealt with in the 
Magistrates’ Court,72 the perception among interviewees was that defendants prefer to be tried 
by jury in the Crown Court, where they are more likely to be acquitted.73 Not all interviewees were 
                                                          
68 Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, ss.3 and 7A. 
69 For an assessment of the shortcomings of the disclosure regime, see House of Commons Justice 
Committee, Disclosure of Evidence in Criminal Cases: Eleventh Report of Session 2017–19 (House of 
Commons, 2018). 
70 See further, Walters, Wiedlitzka and Owusu-Bempah, Hate Crime and the Legal Process (2017), para 
6.2. 
71 The exception is the aggravated s.5 public order offence (harassment, alarm or distress), under s.31(1)(c) 
of the CDA. 
72 Data from 2002 to 2012 shows that approximately 90% of all racially and religiously aggravated offences 
are tried in the Magistrates’ Court. See Home Office, Ministry of Justice and Office for National Statistics, 
An Overview of Hate Crime in England and Wales (2013), Appendix Tables 3.04 and 3.08, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/an-overview-of-hate-crime-in-england-and-wales [accessed 14 
January 2019]. 
73 In 2012, the conviction rate for all RRAOs in the Crown Court was 63.7%. In the Magistrates’ Court, in 
2012, the conviction rate for RRAOs was 74%. Note, however, that only 481, of a total 8,898 defendants, 
were found not guilty – with most other cases being dropped early on. See Home Office, Ministry of Justice 
and Office for National Statistics, An Overview of Hate Crime in England and Wales (2013), Appendix 
Tables 3.07 and 3.08.  
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content with the number of trials on indictment. Three of the judges we interviewed were 
particularly disapproving of “low-level” RRAOs being tried in the Crown Court. Their disapproval 
reflected, in part, a dissatisfaction with “demonstrations of hostility” being prosecuted as serious 
hate crime offences. But, also, Crown Court trials for “not the most serious conduct” (CPS 01) 
were perceived to be largely “a waste of time and money” (CCJ 03).  
Despite not being the most efficient response to hate crime, it was put to us by several 
interviewees that trial by jury is in the best interests of defendants. The legitimacy of hate crime 
legislation depends not only on its ability to protect victims under the law, but it must also respect 
defendants’ rights with regards to adherence to criminal standards of proof. The prosecution bears 
the burden of proving the hostility element beyond reasonable doubt regardless of whether it is 
dealt with at trial or by a judge at a Newton hearing. Yet, juries were thought to be more open to 
defence evidence and more willing to scrutinise the hostility element than judges or magistrates. 
One Crown Court judge explained that: 
“[S]ome defendants have the protection of the verdict of a jury before they can be 
sentenced more severely. Other ones just are because the judge says I’m satisfied of this 
and that, and judges are usually somewhat easy to satisfy of the existence of aggravated 
features than juries maybe.” (CCJ 01)  
Likewise, an independent barrister told us that, “most judges, if they’re sentencing someone, tend 
to go with … ‘We found everything, the prosecution witnesses on the whole true, so aggravate it’” 
(IB 04). Trial by jury can, therefore, act to uphold the presumption of innocence in respect of the 
hostility element of an offence and ensure that the prosecution has met its burden of proof.  
In support of trial by jury, interviewees also noted that it is the role of a jury, and not a judge, to 
decide questions of fact. One barrister felt that it was particularly important that juries consider 
the issue of motive where it is relevant in hate crime cases:   
“[T]here’s something a little distasteful in the context of our criminal code, in the way in 
which our system of justice is evolved, by leaving such important matters of fact to a judge 
when a judge invites the jury into court and tells them, ‘We try this case together. We have 
different roles. You are the judges of fact.’ It’s somewhat out of line if the judge is then in 
a position to decide whether or not something as important as the motivation for the crime, 
in particular with the likely uplift in sentence which may accrue from that. And it is left to 




Although it is the role of the jury to determine questions of fact, we should not be too quick to 
conclude that all hate crime cases should, therefore, be tried by jury. As it stands, most cases are 
tried in the Magistrates’ Court, and, while it was suggested that juries are (or are at least perceived 
to be) more open to the defence version of events than magistrates, the main point of concern 
was that the question of hostility is not always adequately scrutinised when dealt with at 
sentencing. Thus, there was no suggestion from interviewees that all offences that are currently 
summary-only should become indictable-only or triable-either-way where there is a hate crime 
accusation. Moreover, the distinction between the role of judge and jury is not watertight. Outside 
of the context of hate crime, judges often make findings of fact in criminal cases, particularly at 
sentencing when determining the presence of aggravating and mitigating factors which can have 
a significant impact on the sentence passed. Accordingly, if it is to be contended that, in sufficiently 
serious cases,74 defendants should have the option of a jury to determine the issue of identity-
based hostility,  there must be something that sets hate crime apart from other types of behaviour 
which judges are left to evaluate at sentencing.  
Hate, or, more accurately, identity-based “hostility”, is criminalised in certain contexts because it 
is not socially acceptable; because it causes distinct harms75  to individual victims and their wider 
communities, and because it undermines liberal commitments to equality and respect for others, 
as explained below. Additionally, some scholars assert that hate crime laws have an important 
symbolic and educative function, not only sending a message that this type of offending is 
particularly wrongful, but also contributing to a positive shift in societal attitudes towards diversity 
and “difference”.76 However, at the same time, it is important to acknowledge that the criminal law 
is a coercive tool that must be applied with the utmost care in order to avoid erroneously labelling 
someone as a criminal or a “hater”. Wrongful conviction and labelling can have devastating 
consequences for the individual and will reduce confidence in the criminal justice system.  
From a normative position, then, the right to elect a jury trial provides an important safeguard in 
hate crime cases and legitimises outcomes. Since the hostility-element of a “hate crime” is an 
integral component of the offending behaviour, it gives rise to a question of fact that should be 
determined at trial by a jury (where the offence is sufficiently serious), and not a judge during 
                                                          
74 In line with current practice, an offence is ‘sufficiently serious’ to become triable on indictment where the 
maximum sentence exceeds six months’ imprisonment. 
75 See M.A. Walters, ‘Redrawing the Boundaries of Hate Crime: What Characteristics should be “Protected” 
in the Criminal Law?’ Special Issue of Studies in Law, Politics, and Society (forthcoming). 
76 See, for example, M.A. Walters, ‘Readdressing Hate Crime: Synthesizing Law, Punishment and 
Restorative Justice’ in T. Brudholm and B. Johansen (eds), Hate, Politics, Law (Oxford: OUP, 2018). 
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sentencing. The jury system serves to represent the society in which the defendant is accused of 
offending. Jurors, then, are deemed to be best placed to ensure that there is accountability for 
unacceptable conduct that is harmful to society and, at the same time, avoid attributing liability to 
individuals where the state has not met its burden of proof. In the view of one interviewee, the 
CDA is “definitely better for the defence” because “you’d rather a jury decide than a court … it’s 
fair and it gives it a legitimacy … that in any conviction you want to have” (IB 04). It was also 
explained to us that, where a guilty verdict is delivered by a jury, rather than hostility being 
determined at sentencing, the finding may be more readily accepted by the defendant: 
“[A] defendant can’t say, ‘Well the judge had it in for me … he didn’t like me ….’ No, no, 
no … it was the jury … the jury don’t know who you are … This is the first time they’ve 
seen you. They’ve convicted you, not the judge. And the judge simply prompts the 
sentence.” (IB 13) 
There are, thus, undoubted benefits of trial by jury in hate crime cases, in terms of providing 
transparency, ensuring that the prosecution can meet its burden of proof and legitimising case 
outcomes. These benefits indicate that the CDA provides a fairer means of responding to hate 
crime than the CJA.   
The double-edged sword of jury decision-making in hate crime cases: providing a 
tactical advantage to defence counsel  
While our study revealed several strengths in ensuring that juries, as fact-finders, play a central 
role in determining whether the hostility element of an offence is proved beyond reasonable doubt, 
interviews simultaneously uncovered evidence of potential bias amongst both jurors and judges 
that may be limiting the successful application of hate crime laws. Although this can, at times, 
advantage defendants, it is not a situation that we can in good faith advocate as supporting the 
“rights” of defendants in hate crime cases. In some cases, interviewees believed that jurors’ 
ordinary understanding of prejudice and hostility meant that only the most egregious forms of 
majority-group offending against minority-group victim would result in a conviction for the 
aggravated version of an offence. Interviewees spoke of cases involving “same-race” and 
“minority v majority” hate crimes that were often rejected by juries. Given that hate crime laws 
were enacted to protect and respond to violence against minority groups, a jury might not see the 
merit of convicting where the defendant, a member of a marginalised minority group, directed a 
racial slur at a white victim. Likewise, a jury might decide not to convict where a defendant used 
a racialised term which is commonly used amongst individuals within the same identity group and 
which would not ordinarily cause offence or upset when used in this context.  
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However, in other cases, the application of community norms during decision-making could result 
in jurors (and judges) rejecting certain forms of prejudice as legitimate targets for the law. For 
instance, it was suggested to us that juries often return perverse verdicts where the requirements 
of the CDA are satisfied, but where the defendant’s behaviour is considered normal:  
“[J]uries can do what they like. … they can bring in perverse verdicts as long as they want 
to. That’s one of the joys of the system. We’ve no control over them. And certainly, you 
know, if you’ve got an East End case … being dealt with by an East End jury, who see 
this sort of thing going on in their market every bloody day … Nobody pays the slightest 
bit of attention to it … And they don’t want to convict people. Which is wrong in the law. 
But nonetheless right. I would acquit too. … Juries are a lot more sensible than our 
legislators at times, I think …” (IB 01)  
This quotation reveals the perception, also expressed by other interviewees, that some common 
forms of “low-level” prejudice should not be captured by hate crime legislation. This means that 
even where there is evidence of hostility, juries may simply refuse to convict defendants of the 
aggravated version of the offence. One Crown Court judge described their experience of this as 
follows: “I mean, pretty much every case I’ve thought very clearly the offence was racially 
aggravated, but … they come back and say, ‘not guilty’” (CCJ 01). While the majority of cases 
end in conviction, there are clearly enough acquittals in the face of seemingly strong evidence to 
create the perception that jurors do not like to convict defendants of RRAOs.77 
Jury reluctance to convict was attributed primarily to the broad definition of “demonstrating 
hostility” under s.28(1)(a) of the CDA. Section 28 merely requires an “outward manifestation”78 of 
racial or religious hostility during, or immediately before or after, the commission of a basic 
offence. This is most often verbal, for example, the utterance of a racial slur. It does not matter 
why the defendant committed the basic offence and it does not matter why they demonstrated 
hostility.79 Nor does it matter whether the defendant consciously harbours racist views or 
                                                          
77 In 2012, for example, the conviction rate for all RRAOs in the Crown Court was 63.7%. However, it is 
notable that of the 399 cases in which there was a not guilty plea, 278 ended with an acquittal. See Home 
Office, Ministry of Justice and Office for National Statistics, An Overview of Hate Crime in England and 
Wales (2013), Appendix Table 3.08. The conviction ratio for all indictable offences the year ending June 
2012 was 81.7%, and has since risen to 83.7%. See, Ministry of Justice, Criminal Justice Statistics: June 
2018, Overview Table Q3.3. More recent figures from the CPS show that the conviction rate for all cases 
flagged as racially or religiously aggravated, including basic offences and those that fall outside of the scope 
of the CDA, was 84.5% in 2017-18, with 69.9% receiving a sentence uplift. See CPS, Hate Crime Annual 
Report 2017-18. 
78  Rogers [2007] UKHL 8 at [6]. 
79 See, for example, Woods [2002] EWHC 85 (Admin). 
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ideologies.  In sum, where an act or words objectively demonstrate hostility, then the defendant’s 
reasoning for expressing the hostility is not relevant to their liability. Interviewees suggested that, 
in practice, jurors do not take this approach. The perception was that jurors equate a finding of 
guilt with a finding that someone is a “racist”, and they do not want defendants to be labelled as 
a “hater” or “racist” simply because the defendant lost their temper and said something abusive, 
perhaps while drunk or in a fit of rage: 
“… juries look at them and they think, ‘well that person’s not racist. I’m going to find them 
not guilty.’ The legislation doesn’t require the prosecution to prove that people are racist; 
they just have to prove that they’ve demonstrated a hostility. But there is a disconnection, 
I think, within the minds of juries and what the legislation says … they look at defendants 
and they think, ‘they’re not racist. They just said something in the heat of the moment’.” 
(IB 08) 
It is not only jurors who take issue with criminalising demonstrations of hostility. Some academic 
commentators have suggested that “demonstrations”, as against motivations, of hostility should 
not be conceived as “hate crime”. Rather, they argue, these types of offence are better understood 
as acts of frustration, which are more directly correlated with other emotions, such as anger or 
rage, those which are often expressed in the “heat of the moment”.80 As explained above, a 
number of judges that we interviewed were also uncomfortable with demonstrations of hostility 
amounting to an aggravated offence, especially where the defendant acted out of anger.81 One 
judge was of the view that the legislation “includes too much that’s trivial and not genuinely 
motivated by hatred.” They put it to us that, “if I get cross with you and say, ‘Go away you foreign 
bitch!’, that doesn’t mean I hate foreigners does it?” (CCJ 03). Yet, the perception seemed to be 
that jurors are most resistant to the demonstration of hostility test.  
Juror reluctance to convict of RRAOs can provide the defence with a tactical advantage:  
“… what you’ll often find is that the defence will argue that, ‘Well he may have said that, 
but he doesn’t really hate Asian people.’ But obviously … technically that’s not a defence 
under the Act, but it’s still an argument which you sometimes encounter. So that’s the … 
classic scenario.” (IB 07) 
                                                          
80 See, for example, L. Ray, D. Smith, and L. Wastell, ‘Shame, Rage and Racist Violence’ (2004) 44(3) 
British Journal of Criminology 350; D. Gadd, ‘Aggravating Racism and Elusive Motivation’ (2009) 49(6) 
British Journal of Criminology 755. 




Some independent barristers with experience of defence work stated that they could evade the 
legislative requirement of an objective demonstration of hostility by focusing on the question of 
whether the defendant is a “racist”. The term “racist”, in this context, was seemingly used in a very 
narrow sense of consciously hating, or even generally disliking, a particular racial group. Several 
judges and barristers spoke about cases descending into a trial about character, with counsel 
calling numerous witnesses to testify that the defendant has black or Asian friends: 
“The irony is, of course, when it comes to trial, the whole case is taken up as to whether 
your client is racist. So what you do is you call his black dentist, his Chinese doctor, his 
best friend – and I’ve done this – his best [friend] who is a black shop steward, who 
specialises in race relations. And as a result, of course, the jury are absolutely convinced 
you’re the least racist person in the country and they acquit you of everything – including 
the crime you were charged with. So actually, it’s God’s gift to defence I would say.” (IB 
01)  
By focussing on good character and emphasising that the defendant is not “a racist”, the defence 
may not only be able to secure an acquittal on the aggravated offence, but also the basic version 
of the offence, even if there is strong evidence to support both charges.  
A refined hostility test  
The rights and interests of defendants must be taken into account when considering the future of 
hate crime legislation. The analysis of our interview data suggests that the CDA is best placed to 
safeguard certain interests of the defendant, thus providing support for including disability, sexual 
orientation and transgender identity in hate crime offences. Yet, while we assert that hostility is 
best addressed as part of the substantive offence during trial, we do not endorse extension of the 
CDA on the basis that it will help defendants to secure unmerited acquittals. Indeed, as we have 
shown above, the current provisions remain open to manipulation, especially in cases involving 
demonstrations of hostility where hostility is expressed in the “heat of the moment”. One possible 
solution to this issue, is to abolish the demonstration test, relying instead on “motivations” of 
hostility. This, though, would be likely to result in just a handful of successful prosecutions each 
year, as proving motive beyond reasonable doubt is a highly complex task, and one which our 
interviewees noted defeats most prosecutors.82 There are also two important points of principle 
that justify the maintenance of the demonstration of hostility test.  
                                                          
82 See Walters, Wiedlitzka and Owusu-Bempah, Hate Crime and the Legal Process (2017), para 8.1. 
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First, as Walters argues, most expressions of identity-based hostility are either intended or 
recklessly expressed in order to subjugate the victim’s identity.83 As such, most demonstrations 
of hostility are conscious attempts to subordinate victims based on their characteristics.84 To 
determine whether a demonstration of hostility is meant to subjugate the victim’s identity, we need 
only ask one question: “would the offender have used similar language if directing the insult 
towards someone of the same or similar ethnic identity to himself?”.85 If the answer is no, then we 
can draw inferences from the fact that the defendant decided to use the victim’s ethnic background 
as part of their insult.86 Goodall similarly asserts that: 
“So long as an offender flung out his racial insult intending it at that moment to diminish his 
victim on that ground – or utterly disregarded the possibility that it would have that effect – 
then it is an integral part of his conduct, not any mere ulterior intent nor unintended by-
product. His act is thus a constitutive element of the crime.”87 
Thus, while the majority of offenders are not hardened bigots who make it their mission in life to 
eradicate “difference”,88 culpability is enhanced to reflect the intention (or at least awareness) to 
denigrate the victim because of the victim’s identity. Defendants should, therefore, not be able to 
rely on the excuse that they are not conscious bigots in their day to day lives. As one District 
Judge succinctly put it, “not everyone when they’ve had too much to drink refers to people in 
racially abusive terms, so is it really an excuse …?” (DJ 07).  
The second argument is that, demonstrations of hostility are likely to have distinct (enhanced) 
impacts on a victim and their community, regardless of whether the defendant is motivated by 
hostility or lashes out in the heat of the moment.89 Research has shown that hate-based violence 
(the vast majority of which involves a demonstrations of hostility) is likely to cause heightened 
levels of vulnerability, anxiety, anger and even shame amongst victims,90 which in turn frequently 
affects the way individuals dress, how they speak, and where they are prepared to travel to. These 
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 See M.A. Walters, ‘Conceptualizing “Hostility” for Hate Crime Law: Minding “the Minutiae” when 
Interpreting Section 28(1)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998’ (2014) 34(1) O.J.L.S. 47. 
84 The subordination of “difference” is what Perry argues is the key to understanding hate crime: B. Perry, 
In the Name of Hate: Understanding Hate Crimes (London: Routledge, 2001). 
85 Walters, ‘Conceptualizing “Hostility” for Hate Crime Law: Minding “the Minutiae” when Interpreting Section 
28(1)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998’ (2014), 68. 
86 Walters, ‘Conceptualizing “Hostility” for Hate Crime Law: Minding “the Minutiae” when Interpreting Section 
28(1)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998’ (2014), 68.  
87 K. Goodall, ‘Conceptualising “Racism” in Criminal Law’ (2013) 33(2) L.S. 215, 237.  
88 P. Iganski, Hate Crime and the City (Bristol: Policy Press, 2008). 
89 See Walters, “Redrawing the Boundaries of Hate Crime: What Characteristics should be “Protected” in 
the Criminal Law?” Special Issue of Studies in Law, Politics, and Society (forthcoming). 
90 P. Iganski, ‘Hate Crimes Hurt More’ (2001) 45 American Behavioral Scientist 626. 
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impacts can ripple out and affect other individuals in the community who share the victim’s identity 
traits.91 Demonstrations of identity-based hostility can also cause social, or cultural, harm by 
undermining society’s political commitments to equality, respect and dignity.92  
Were we to write off demonstrations of hostility as mere drunken mistakes, or as uncharacteristic 
moments of madness, we would be likely to undermine the concept of hate crime altogether. As 
one District Judge lamented: 
“I think if one sort of adopts the approach that somehow that things that are said in the 
heat of the moment are less significant, then I think that that’s creating the opportunity for 
the unscrupulous to try to avoid the consequences of their behaviour, and at the same 
time, that ignores the impact upon the community at large and the individual who has 
suffered it.” (DJ 09) 
For these reasons, the demonstration of hostility test should remain part of the CDA. However, 
as we have seen, simply maintaining this aspect of the legislation has not in itself prevented the 
manipulation or misinterpretation of the CDA provisions.  Arguably, the test must be clarified, most 
appropriately under common law, so that the provisions are more clearly understood. Clarification 
and refinement of the test for a “demonstration of hostility” could not only challenge reluctance to 
attribute liability to those who act out in the “heat of the moment”, but also safeguard defendants 
against improper or inappropriate conviction. 
The appellate courts have emphasised that s.28(1)(a), as it currently stands, requires only an 
objective outward manifestation of hostility. But it is not entirely clear whether, in practice, the 
defendant’s knowledge and intentions as to the demonstration of hostility are relevant 
considerations. For instance, must the defendant intend to express or demonstrate identity-based 
hostility, as opposed to, for example, using a term that is considered by others to be hostile, but 
that was not intended as such by the defendant? One interviewee provided an example of a 
defendant using the phrase “black bastards” to refer to the colour of the uniform worn by a group 
of (mostly white) police officers, and not (as the police assumed) the colour of one of the officer’s 
skin (DJ 06).  
                                                          
91 B. Perry and S. Alvi, ‘“We are all Vulnerable”: The in Terrorem Effects of Hate Crimes’ (2012) 18(1) 
International Review of Victimology 57; J. Patterson, R. Brown and M.A. Walters, ‘Feeling for and as a 
Group Member: Understanding LGBT Victimization via Group-Based Empathy and Intergroup Emotions 
(2018) British Journal of Social Psychology doi:10.1111/bjso.12269. 
92 See, in relation to sexual offences, C. McGlynn and E. Rackley, ‘Criminalising Extreme Pornography: A 
Lost Opportunity’ [2009] 4 Crim. L.R. 245. 
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Even if the demonstration is not intended to express hostility, should criminal liability for an 
aggravated offence be made out where defendant is at least aware that they demonstrated racial 
or religious hostility? For example, should a defendant who uses a racialised slur during the 
commission of an offence, not knowing that it is a racialised term, be found to have demonstrated 
racial hostility? Without the defendant intending or being aware of a term’s inferred meaning, can 
we legitimately label and punish him or her as a “hate crime” offender? As stated above, it is 
intentional and reckless demonstrations of hostility that amount to a conscious attempt to 
subjugate a victim based on their identity. The wrongfulness of criminal conduct, and the level of 
culpability apportioned to an offender, must not only reflect the enhanced harm caused by 
hostility-based action, but must simultaneously reflect the mental state of the offender.   
To resolve the issues around the concept of “demonstrating hostility”, and to ensure that 
s.28(1)(a) is applied in a manner that reflects both harm and culpability, we advocate the adoption 
by the courts of the refined test put forward by Walters.93 In determining whether hostility has 
been demonstrated by the defendant, whether applying the CDA or CJA, the court or jury may 
wish to ask:  
“(1) Would the defendant have directed the same insult towards anyone, regardless of 
their identity characteristics? And, 
(a) Is the defendant aware that such an insult demonstrates racial, religious, sexual 
orientation, disability or transgender based hostility? 
Or 
(b) Does he understand that his language or conduct is likely to be understood by right-
minded people as indicating hostility towards the victim based on the victim’s (perceived) 
identity characteristic? 
If the answer is no to the first question and yes to either part of the second it is clear that 
the demonstration made is one of hostility.”94 
This test could help to ensure that only those who are “aware” of the identity-based “hostility” 
element of their actions are found culpable and sentenced as “hate crime” offenders. Thus, 
utterances of words that are not intended, or at least not understood as identity-based slurs, would 
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28(1)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998’ (2014), 72. 
27 
 
not fall within the meaning of “demonstrating hostility”. At the same time, this test could help the 
courts and juries to understand that the purpose of s. 28(1)(a) of the CDA is not to find guilt of 
racist or anti-religious beliefs (i.e. beliefs that underpin motive), but to find criminal fault for an 
expression of hostility that is connected to a basic offence. 
Conclusion 
There are a number of reasons why, from a victim and prosecution perspective, it would be 
beneficial to extend the CDA to cover the personal characteristics that are currently only set out 
in s.146 of the CJA. These reasons are explained at length in an earlier article and in our final 
report.95 This article has considered the question of reform primarily from the perspective of the 
defence. We have uncovered a number of ways in which the current system for prosecuting 
aggravated offences creates the potential for improper and inappropriate convictions, while also 
adversely affecting victims of hate crime, and we have provided recommendations to rectify this 
problem, including changes to charging practices and a refined “demonstration of hostility” test. 
Through our interviews with lawyers and judges, we also found that, notwithstanding the 
procedural problems, the rights and interests of defendants can be better protected through 
prosecution of specific hate crime offences (particularly where there is the option of trial by jury) 
than through the application of enhanced sentencing provisions. In particular, dealing with the 
hostility element of an offence at trial provides defendants with the greatest opportunity to prepare 
and to challenge the accusations against them. This is true not only in respect of the 11 basic 
offences set out in ss.29 to 32 of the CDA, but of all criminal offences. Thus, as it stands, someone 
accused of an offence which can be prosecuted as racially aggravated under the CDA may be 
better safeguarded against an erroneous outcome than someone accused of an offence to which 
the CDA does not apply, just as someone accused of a racially aggravated assault may be better 
safeguarded than someone accused of a homophobic assault. We, therefore, conclude that 
properly operating substantive offences would be the fairest and most effective legislative 
response to accusations of crime involving identity-based hostility toward statutorily recognised 
hate crime characteristics.96 
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